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The Scorecard so Far: Emerging
Issues in Cross-Border Insolvencies
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Bankruptcy Code
Megan R. O’Flynn*
Abstract: Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code was modeled after the Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, drafted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL) in 1997. Despite the relatively small
number of cases commenced in U.S. Courts under Chapter 15 since its adoption,
no other section of the current Bankruptcy Code has broader implications for
international business transactions and global foreign business relations than
the provisions of Chapter 15. Moreover, since the United States has long been
an innovator at the forefront of international insolvency law, interpretation of
key provisions of the Chapter and related UNCITRAL Model Law complements
by U.S. courts could provide meaningful guidance for foreign policymakers and
courts as well as foreign and domestic businesses operating globally. This
Comment provides a brief history of international insolvency law, focusing on
the development of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the eventual adoption of
Chapter 15 into U.S. Bankruptcy Code and its impacts on substantive U.S. law.
It then examines two major emerging legal issues facing U.S courts since
Chapter 15’s adoption, namely, the development of the “Center of Main
Interests” analysis and the “Public Policy Exception,” and analyzes these issues
within the framework of the stated goals of the Chapter as defined in the Code
and based on the Model Law.
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The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA or the Act), signed into law by President George W. Bush on
April 20, 2005, represented the “largest overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code
since its enactment in 1978.”1 BAPCPA’s overall purpose was to “improve
bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and
integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the system is fair for both
debtors and creditors.”2 While the majority of the Act focused on personal
consumer bankruptcy actions, parts of the Act had significant effects on
commercial bankruptcies. Specifically, the new Chapter 15 addressed the
filing of a petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding and replaced the
repealed Bankruptcy Code Section 304 (Section 304).3 Despite the
sweeping changes indicated by BAPCPA overall, commentators noted prior
to its adoption that enactment would not likely make substantial changes to
the treatment of cross-border insolvencies in U.S. courts.4
Chapter 15 was modeled after and incorporated the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency, drafted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL) in 1997 and officially adopted
by the U.N. General Assembly in January 1998.5 Since Chapter 15’s
1
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005: LAW AND
EXPLANATION 3 (Sheila M. Williams et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Williams, BANKRUPTCY
ABUSE PREVENTION].
2
H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), at 1 (2005) reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
3
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C. §1501
(2006); ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005: A SECTION -BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 29 (2005). Section
304, enacted in 1978, also related to bankruptcy cases which were ancillary to foreign
proceedings, however, Chapter 15 expanded upon and made significant departures from the
previous procedures of the Bankruptcy Code, see discussion infra Section I.B.
4
U.S. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 361
(1997), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/reporttitlepg.html.
5
G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l
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effective date of October 17, 2005, only about 300 cases have been
commenced in the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts under the chapter, a negligible
proportion of the more than 4.35 million bankruptcy cases commenced
under all chapters of the Code during that time. 6 A total of 140 Chapter 15
cases were filed in 2009, up from 48 in 2008.7 Of these, the most active
Chapter 15 courts were the Southern District of New York (thirty-six cases
filed) and the District of Delaware (twenty-five cases filed). 8
Despite the small number of cases filed under Chapter 15, no other
section of the current Bankruptcy Code has broader implications for
international business transactions and global foreign business relations
than the provisions of Chapter 15. Moreover, since the United States has
long been an innovator at the forefront of international insolvency law,
particularly since its 1978 adoption of Chapter 15 predecessor Section 304
of the Code, 9 interpretation of key provisions of the Chapter and related
UNCITRAL Model Law complements by U.S. courts could provide
meaningful guidance for foreign policymakers and courts as well as foreign
and domestic businesses operating globally.
This Comment will examine some of the key emerging legal issues in
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts surrounding cross-border insolvency proceedings
since the adoption of Chapter 15, and it will analyze those issues within the
framework of the stated goals of the Chapter as defined in the Code and
based on the Model Law. Part I will provide a brief history of international
insolvency law, focusing on the development of the UNCITRAL Model
Law and the eventual adoption of Chapter 15, and highlight substantive
Trade Law, Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,
U.N. DOC. A/CN.9/442 (1997) available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html
(hereinafter
UNCITRAL);
Williams,
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION, supra note 1, at 155.
6
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at tbls. F-2 (2006)–(2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx. Note that more than 300 potential
cases may have been filed for recognition under Chapter 15 but some have been rejected for
recognition. Total bankruptcy filings up to Sept. 2009 were: 1,402,816 in 2009; 1,042,993 in
2008; 801,269 in 2007; and 1,112,542 in 2006. Id.
7
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at 24 (2009), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx [hereinafter ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS.]
(figures cited in 2009 are for the period ending Sept. 30, 2009. There were forty-nine
Chapter 15 cases filed in 2007 and sixty-nine filed in 2006, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS.,
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at
tbls. F-2 (2006)–(2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.
aspx). The reason for the significant increase in filings in 2009 is not entirely clear, although
the worldwide financial crisis of late 2008 may have contributed to the jump in filings during
2009.
8
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 7.
9
See U.S. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 4, at 354 (highlighting U.S.
leadership in the field of international insolvencies and restructuring and encouraging the
adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency).
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legal changes to the Bankruptcy Code brought about by the Chapter’s
adoption. Part II will examine two major emerging legal issues facing U.S
courts since the Chapter’s adoption, namely, the development of the
“Center of Main Interests” analysis and the “Public Policy Exception,”
analyze the potential direction of law going forward, and offer suggestions
for adaptations and change. Finally, Part III will offer some broader
recommendations and concluding thoughts surrounding cross-border
insolvencies pursuant to Chapter 15.
I.

INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCIES, THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW, AND CHAPTER 15
The significant differences in insolvency regulation and procedure
among nations and increased globalization of business activities over the
last several decades led to a need for a clearer understanding of applicable
law between countries and some level of parity of the legal parameters of
cross-border insolvency. This Part details the development and eventual
adoption by the United States and other nations of the most widely accepted
international insolvency guidelines developed through the United Nations’
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies, the changes to U.S. bankruptcy
law through the adoption of the Model Law into Chapter 15, and the main
goals and purposes of the revised Code as it pertains to international
insolvencies.
A.

Development and Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvencies
In response to the rapid expansion of global economic activities in the
latter part of the 20th Century, a number of international and regional
organizations undertook the task of harmonizing the bankruptcy process
across national borders but encountered significant difficulties in creating
unified solutions and gaining wide acceptance of standards.10 Despite these
difficulties, in 1992 the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) began to work in earnest to create such a model. 11

10

U.N. Secretariat, Possible Future Work: Cross-Border Insolvency: Note by the
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/378/Add.4 (June 23, 1993), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V93/865/52/IMG/V9386552.pdf?OpenElement
(detailing
various regional initiatives to harmonize insolvency law in areas including Latin America
and Europe, and through groups like the International Bar Association, but noting a
significant lack of harmony between the initiatives overall); see also Insolvency
Restructuring and Creditors’ Rights Library, INT’L BAR ASS’N, http://www.ibanet.
org/LPD/SIRC/Inslvncy_Rstrcrng_Crdtrs_Rights/SIRC_Library.aspx (last visited June 13,
2012) (general documents on international insolvency efforts).
11
Jenny Clift, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency—A Legislative
Framework to Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency, 12
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 307–08 (2004).
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From 1993 to 1995, UNCITRAL, along with INSOL International, 12 held a
number of judicial conferences and other joint international meetings, as
well as conducted a number of studies, to assess the feasibility and process
for creating a workable, unified cross-border insolvency model. 13 These
efforts noted a number of barriers to the development of a unified model
process, including the inadequacy of current local insolvency laws,
unpredictability of implementation of laws, and the potential costs and
delays of cross-border insolvency proceedings. 14
Given these concerns, the UNCITRAL Congress agreed to address a
number of key cross-border insolvency issues it felt were manageable and
had potential for resolution. These included focusing on cooperation
among the courts of the States where debtors’ assets are located, allowing
foreign representatives to have access to local court proceedings and
creditors, and encouraging comity of certain orders of foreign courts in
insolvency matters.15 A working group of States, inter-governmental
organizations, and nongovernmental groups including the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, the European Insolvency
Practitioners Association, the International Bar Association, and the
International Chamber of Commerce worked to create the Model Law in
Cross-Border Insolvency, 16 adopted by UNCITRAL in May 1997.17
Though the United States did not formally adopt the UNCITRAL
Model Law until a number of years later, the U.S. National Bankruptcy
Review Commission (NBRC) recommended the Model Law for adoption
under the Bankruptcy Code as early as October 1997.18 In its report to
President Clinton, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Congress, the NBRC noted
that UNCITRAL’s work represented a “groundbreaking development of an
international model law on insolvency and reorganization” and
recommended changes to the Bankruptcy Code in order to conform to the

12

Insol International, INT’L ASS’N OF RESTRUCTURING, INSOLVENCY, & BANKR. PROF’ LS,
http://www.insol.org/ (last visited June 13, 2012).
13
Clift, supra note 11, at 309.
14
Id. at 309–10; U.N. Secretariat, Cross-Border Insolvency: Report on UNCITRAL—
INSOL Colloquium on Cross-Border Insolvency, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Comm’n on
Int’l Trade Law, 4 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/398 (May 19, 1994).
15
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade, Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the
Work of its Twentieth Session, Oct. 7–18, 1996, 3 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/433 (Oct. 7, 1996).
16
See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade, Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on
the Work of its Twenty-First Session, Jan. 20–31, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/435 (Jan. 20,
1997) (detailing the numerous organizations of the working group).
17
G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., 72nd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/52/17(1997);
Look Chan Ho, Overview, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY : A COMMENTARY ON THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 7 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2d ed. 2009).
18
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission is an independent commission
established pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat.
4106.
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Model Law.19
The 1997 NRBC Report noted that “although . . . changes will be
beneficial, the principal benefit to the United States from adopting the
Model Law will lie in the effect of its adoption on other jurisdictions” since
“[e]arly adoption by the United States is likely to influence other countries
to adopt [the] law and to spur international organizations to encourage
countries to do so.”20 However, the delay of U.S. adoption of the code until
2005 did not seem to deter other nations from recognizing the importance
and usefulness of the Model Law in their own insolvency provisions. 21
Between the time of the NRBC’s initial report and the official adoption of
the U.S. BAPCPA reforms including Chapter 15, a number of countries
enacted all or parts of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Eritrea, Mexico, South
Africa, Japan, Montenegro, Northern Ireland and the British Virgin Islands,
Poland, Romania, and Serbia all adopted the Model Law before 2005.22
B. U.S. Adoption of Chapter 15 and Changes to the Bankruptcy Code
In its 1997 Report, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
stated that “because the United States is already a world leader” in the field
of international insolvency law, “adoption of the [UNCITRAL] Model Law
will result in relatively minor substantive changes to U.S. Bankruptcy

19

U.S. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 4, at 353.
Id. at 361.
21
Note that adoption does not necessarily mean a nation will use the Model Law in full
or even in partial force. Currently, South Africa’s version of the Model Law only applies to
official, designated countries, of which there are currently none, leaving that nation’s Act to
implement the law practically inapplicable. Ian R. De Witt, Presentation at the 16th
Commonwealth Law Conference in Hong Kong: Challenges of Cross-Border Insolvencies:
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, Hong Kong and the
Commonwealth (Apr. 2009), summary available at http://www.tannerdewitt.com/media/
publications/challenges-of-cross-border-insolvencies.php. In addition, Argentina, Mexico
and Romania all require reciprocity before the Model Law provisions are applied to a foreign
proceeding. Scott C. Mund, 11 U.S.C. 1506: U.S. Courts Keep a Tight Rein on the Public
Policy Exception, but the Potential to Undermine International Cooperation in Insolvency
Proceedings Remains, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 336 (2010).
22
As of February 2010, Eritrea (1998), Mexico (2000), South Africa (2000), Japan
(2000), Montenegro (2002), Northern Ireland and the British Virgin Islands (2003), Poland
(2003), Romania (2003), Serbia (2004) had all adopted the Model Law. Omer Shahid, Note,
The Public Policy Exception: Has § 1506 Been a Significant Obstacle in Aiding Foreign
Bankruptcy Proceedings?, 9 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 175, 178 (2010). Canada also began drafting
provisions to their Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) modeled somewhat after
the UNCITRAL Model Law in the early 2000’s. The revised CCAA provisions came into
force on September 18, 2009, including official adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, §§ 267–84 and the
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, §§ 44–61 (Can.);
see generally Steven Golick & Marc Wasserman, Canada, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY :
A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW 59, 59–85 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2d ed.
2009) (discussing the Canadian adoption process of Model Law provisions).
20
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Law.”23 While perhaps true in the abstract, adoption of the Model Law did
in fact create significant codified changes to the process and procedure of
international insolvencies in the context of the U.S. Bankruptcy system,
and, as explored below in this Comment, may have served to create
significant secondary legal and practical conundrums as well for a number
of reasons. 24
In general, Chapter 15 maintained the spirit of its predecessor Section
304 (Cases Ancillary to Foreign Proceedings). 25
Both favor
“universalism”—a centralized administration of a debtor’s assets in one
primary proceeding, with proceedings in other courts being ancillary—
rather than a territorialist approach in which multiple courts seek to assert
jurisdiction and claims for assets among creditors. 26 Chapter 15 and
Section 304 also both aimed to maintain the majority of foreign insolvency
proceedings as U.S. ancillary proceedings. 27 Taken together, these
preferences suggest that courts, when given discretion, will often favor a
foreign debtor’s “home country” as the location for the main bankruptcy
action, with any U.S. proceedings being ancillary to the foreign
proceeding.28 Another significant change is that Chapter 15 is more
prescriptive in its desire to establish interstate cooperation, dictating that the
U.S. courts cooperate with a foreign court or representative “to the
maximum extent possible.”29
As a departure from Section 304, however, Chapter 15 expanded the
cross-border insolvency purview to include laws that apply not only to
23

U.S. NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 4, at 361.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–32 (2006); 11 U.S.C. § 304 (repealed 2005). Though not any
sort of scientific measure, it is worth noting that 11 U.S.C. 304 contained about 250 words in
total, while Chapter 15 contains thirty-two sections and over 4,500 words in its text. Even
without delving into the details of the new Chapter, it is likely that impactful changes will
arise from the adoption of a much more standardized and “strict” process of cross-border
insolvencies in the United States.
25
11 U.S.C. § 304 (repealed 2005).
26
Brendan Mockler, Chapter 15 Choice of Avoidance Law in U.S. Bankruptcy Court: Is
it Really a Choice?, 2009 NORTON ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. L. PT. I § 11 (2009).
27
Id.
28
See H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), Pt. 1 § 1504 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88
(highlighting that the preference for ancillary status is still in force. “The title ‘ancillary’ in
the title of this section and in the title of this chapter emphasizes the United States policy in
favor of a general rule that countries other than the home country of the debtor, where a main
proceeding would be brought, should usually act through ancillary proceedings in aid of the
main proceedings, in preference to a system of full bankruptcies (often called ‘secondary’
proceedings) in each state where assets are found. Under the Model Law, notwithstanding
the recognition of a foreign main proceeding, full bankruptcy cases are permitted in each
country (see sections 1528 and 1529).”).
29
11 U.S.C. § 1525(a); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1527. Accord In re Artimm, S.r.L., 335
B.R. 149, 159 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2005) (aligning with the directive of Chapter 15 to
cooperate with foreign courts and detailing the actual and potential consequences of such
cooperation).
24
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those U.S. cases deemed ancillary to foreign proceedings but also to other
sorts of cross-border cases. These included cases started in the United
States which could impact non-U.S. creditors or involve non-U.S. assets as
well as cases pending concurrently in U.S. and non-U.S. courts.30
While this change expanded the types of cases the courts might
recognize and hear in U.S. bankruptcy proceedings, perhaps a more
significant change brought on by Chapter 15 served to effectively remove
considerable discretionary power from U.S. courts. Under § 304,
cooperation with foreign jurisdictions in the context of U.S. ancillary
bankruptcy proceedings was wholly discretionary. 31 However, pursuant to
Chapter 15, cooperation with the foreign country and preference for its
proceeding to progress as a “foreign main” proceeding is mandated if the
foreign proceeding is recognized as being filed in the debtor’s “home
country,” triggering other provisions of the Code. 32 This change, which
aligns with the Model Law, increases the United States’ default preference
favoring universalism. 33 However, as discussed below, defining the
debtor’s “home” through the provisions of determining if the case is a
“foreign main” or “foreign nonmain” proceeding has sometimes proven
difficult.34
Section 1501(c) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code identifies the entities
that are excluded from the section by referencing section 109 of the Code
(‘Who may be a debtor’).35 It also sets a framework in which corporations
and other business entities may obtain relief in U.S. Bankruptcy Courts. 36
This section was created to closely mirror Section 304. Under Chapter 15,
while foreign insurance companies can commence or join a proceeding,
30

Selina A. Melnik, United States, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY : A COMMENTARY ON
265, 272 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2d ed. 2009); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 1501(b) (highlighting that the chapter applies to cases where assistance is sought either by
the United States or by a foreign court or representative in connection with a bankruptcy
proceeding in the alternate forum, where domestic and foreign bankruptcy cases are pending
concurrently, or where foreign entities, including creditors, have an interest in beginning or
participating in a domestic proceeding).
31
Hon. Allan L. Gropper, Current Developments in International Insolvency Law: A
United States Perspective, PRACTISING L. INST. COM. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES,
PLI Order No. 14441, 906 PLI/Comm 685, 702 (2008).
32
See Andrew B. Dawson, Offshore Bankruptcies, 88 NEB. L. REV. 317, 327–28 (2009)
(examining the mandatory requirement of cooperation under Chapter 15. Note that
“cooperation remains discretionary if the foreign proceeding is not in the debtor’s [Center of
Main Interests], but rather in a jurisdiction where the debtor has an “establishment”—
defined as a place where the debtor carries on nontransitory economic activity.”).
33
See discussion of determining one’s “home country” through the COMI analysis, infra
p. 402; see also John J. Chung, The Retrogressive Flaw of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy
Code: A Lesson from Maritime Law, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253, 253–54 (2007)
(criticizing the reliance on universalism in the Chapter 15 context).
34
For discussion of the foreign main/foreign nonmain distinction, see infra Part II.A.1.
35
11 U.S.C. § 1501(c) (2006).
36
Id.
THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
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foreign banks, foreign railroads, domestic insurance companies, and
domestic banks are not permitted to pursue action. 37 Moreover, the
individual filing requirements under 11 U.S.C.A. § 1501(c)(2) suggest that
very few individual consumers will be able to pursue relief under the
chapter, as it does not apply to individual debtors who are citizens or
permanent resident aliens of the United States and creates other restrictions
that limit the number of non-citizen and non-resident individuals who
would likely qualify under the chapter. 38 This varies from the Model Law,
which does not make a distinction between consumer and business
debtors.39
Last, because it created certain mandatory court actions, Chapter 15
also contains a public policy exception which can limit otherwise
mandatory actions, including the recognition or primacy of foreign
proceedings. The language of Chapter 15 states that “[n]othing in [Chapter
15] prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this
chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the
United States.”40
C. Purposes & Goals of Chapter 15 and Recent Foreign Model Law
Adoption
In addition to creating the changes and exclusions described above, the
37

Id. Note that foreign insurance companies can qualify as a “debtor” under Chapter 15.

Id.
38

See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(c)(2) (dictating that individuals or a marital couple are not
eligible to proceed under Chapter 15 if their debts are within the limits specified in section
109(e) of the Code and who are “citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the United States.” Effective April 1, 2010, “an individual with
regular income that owes, on the date of the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated,
unsecured debts of less than $360,475 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less
than $1,081,400, or an individual with regular income and such individual’s spouse, except a
stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the date of the filing of the petition,
noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts that aggregate less than $360,475 and
noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $1,081,400” are eligible to file under
Chapter 13 of the Code and therefore ineligible to proceed under Chapter 15. 11 U.S.C. §
109(e). In 2009, the average Chapter 7 bankruptcy individual filer with complete schedules
of assets and liabilities (943,995 total) had $112,561 more in liabilities than in assets, and the
average Chapter 13 filer with complete schedules (356,807 total) had $51,725 more in
liabilities than in assets. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 2009 REPORT OF STATISTICS
REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF
2005, at Tables 1A & 1D (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
BankruptcyStatistics.aspx. This suggests that most individual petitioners would not be
eligible to pursue a bankruptcy case under Chapter 15. For the twelve-month period ending
Sept. 30, 2009, approximately 1.34 million of the total 1.4 million bankruptcy petitions filed
were individual filings. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CTS., ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at 291 (2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx).
39
Williams, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION, supra note 1, at 157.
40
11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006).
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first section of Chapter 15 also outlined the primary purposes of the
Chapter. These purposes closely mirror the goals and purposes of the
UNCITRAL Model Law itself, and the section is quite unique when
compared to other chapters of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which do not
include any statement of purpose or goals. 41 The goals are outlined as
follows:
The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency so as to provide effective mechanisms for
dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency with the objectives
of—
(1) cooperation between—
(A) courts of the United States, United States trustees,
trustees, examiners, debtors, and debtors in possession;
and
(B) the courts and other competent authorities of foreign
countries involved in cross-border insolvency cases;
(2) greater legal certainty for trade and investment;
(3) fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies
that protects the interests of all creditors, and other interested
entities, including the debtor;
(4) protection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s
assets; and
(5) facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses,
thereby protecting investment and preserving employment.42

Additionally, § 1508 dictates that “in interpreting this chapter, the
court shall consider its international origin, and the need to promote an
application of this chapter that is consistent with the application of similar
statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.”43 Finally, any determination for
assistance under Chapter 15 must be “consistent with the principles of
comity.”44 This requirement aligns with the primary considerations under
41

This is not to say, however, that other sections of the Code do not have specific
purposes or goals within them (protecting the interests of creditors, ensuring the speedy
resolution of proceedings, etc.), but rather that the goals of Chapter 15 are clearly set forth
and designed as a lead in to the entire Chapter. 11 U.S.C. § 1501.
42
11 U.S.C. § 1501(a).
43
11 U.S.C. § 1508.
44
11 U.S.C. § 1507; see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (defining comity
generally as “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
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the repealed Section 304.45
After U.S. adoption in 2005, nine nations have adopted all or
significant parts of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency. Most notably, Great Britain adopted the Model Law in 2006
and Australia followed suit in 2008.46 In addition, while the Cayman
Islands has not adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law per se, the nation’s
“Grand Court applies Model Law principals in all but name.” 47
II. KEY EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES
Scholars examining Chapter 15 and its predecessor Section 304 have
sometimes focused on the broader debate of the values of universalism
contained in the Bankruptcy Code and the values of a more territorial
approach to international insolvencies. 48 However, two significant lines of
legal inquiry have emerged that highlight the narrower, practical issues
facing U.S. courts in the cross-border bankruptcy context: the Center of
Main Interest (COMI) Analysis and the Public Policy Exception. Here, this
Comment will explore these issues by considering the language of Code,
examining domestic and foreign case law, and analyzing potential for
revision and change.

convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws”); U.S. v. J.A. Jones Const. Group, LLC, 333 B.R. 637, 638 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (discussing the primacy and importance of comity as a concept to adhere to in the
context of Chapter 15 proceedings).
45
See In re Ran, 390 B.R. 257, 291 (Bankr. S. D. Tex. 2008) (noting that “all relief under
section 304 was discretionary and based on subjective, comity-influenced factors”); see also
H.R.REP. NO. 95-595, at 324–25, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6280–81; S.REP.
NO. 95-989, at 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821 (legislative history of § 304
stating that “these guidelines are designed to give the court the maximum flexibility in
handling ancillary cases. Principles of international comity and respect for the judgments
and laws of other nations suggest that the court be permitted to make the appropriate orders
under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than being provided with inflexible
rules.”).
46
Shahid, supra note 22, at 178; See also, Status, 1997—Model Law on Cross-border
Insolvency, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/
1997Model_status.html (last visited June 13, 2012) (showing that the nations which have
adopted the Model Law are Great Britain (2006), New Zealand (2006), Columbia (2006),
South Korea (2006), Slovenia (2007), Australia (2008), Mauritius (2009), Canada (2009),
and Greece (2010)).
47
Tony Heaver-Wren & Jeremy Walton, Cayman Islands, in CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY : A COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL M ODEL LAW 87 (Look Chan Ho ed., 2d
ed. 2009) (noting that major amendments to the Cayman Islands’ Companies Law through
the Companies (Amendment) Law 2007 “codifies the Grand Court’s powers to make orders
in aid of foreign insolvency proceedings.” Id. at 88).
48
See, e.g., Chung, supra note 33, at 253–54 (criticizing the reliance on universalism in
the Chapter 15 context); Edward S. Adams & Jason Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border
Bankruptcy: How Territorialism Saves Universalism, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 43 (2008)
(comparing the values of universalism and territorialism in cross-border insolvencies).
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A. The Center of Main Interests (COMI) Analysis
1. Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding and COMI in the Language
of Chapter 15
One of the most significant changes to the United States Courts’
treatment of international insolvencies is that which changed the discretion
of the Court and practically mandated foreign cooperation in some cases.
If a foreign entity can be classified as a “debtor” by overcoming the
hurdles of Section 1501(c), 49 it might logically follow that they would be
able to qualify for relief under Chapter 15. As one commentator notes,
“from the plain language of Chapter 15, it appears that a foreign corporation
that is not a railroad or a banking institution, and that has residence,
domicile, place of business, or property in the United States can obtain
relief under Chapter 15.”50 However, as discussed below, the process of
obtaining relief has proven much more cumbersome in some cases.
A Chapter 15 case is commenced by filing a petition for recognition of
a foreign proceeding pursuant to Section 1515 by a foreign representative. 51
Recognition under Chapter 15 is crucial: if a court refuses to recognize a
proceeding, foreign proceedings or debtors may be jurisdictionally estopped
from seeking relief or cooperation from U.S. state or federal courts.52
In order to gain recognition under Chapter 15, a non-U.S. proceeding
must be designated as a “foreign proceeding.” Under the Code, a foreign
proceeding is:
[A] collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign
country, including an interim proceeding, under a law relating to
insolvency or adjustment of debt in which proceeding the assets and
affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign

49

See discussion supra Section I.B. of “who may be a debtor.”
Judith Elkin et al., Sauce for the Goose? Dual Standard Emerging in Cross Border
Insolvencies: Domicile Not Enough to Recognize Foreign Proceeding, Bankruptcy &
Reorganizations: Current Developments 2010, PRACTISING L. INST. COM. L. & PRAC.
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. 22594, 927 PLI/Comm 947, 952 (2010).
51
11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2006); see 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (defining a “foreign representative”
as a person or body, including an interim representative, “authorized in a foreign proceeding
to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets or affairs or to act as
a representative of such foreign proceeding”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1515 (dictating that a
foreign representative must file a petition for recognition including English language
translations of any court decisions certifying a foreign proceeding, a certificate from the
foreign court affirming the existence of foreign proceedings and/or the appointment of a
foreign representative, etc.).
52
See 11 U.S.C. § 1509(d). Note that Chapter 15 recognition is affirmatively not a
prerequisite for U.S. court cooperation in the case where the foreign representative is seeking
assistance from the U.S. solely to “collect or recover a claim which is the property of the
debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 1509(f).
50
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court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.53

However, under Chapter 15, the foreign proceeding must be classified
specifically as a “foreign main” or “foreign nonmain” proceeding in order
to gain recognition.54 These concepts are adopted virtually word-for-word
from the UNCITRAL Model Law.55 In addition, courts have held that the
main/nonmain distinction must be considered primary to and apart from any
consideration of comity. 56
Chapter 15 defines “foreign main proceeding” to mean “a foreign
proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its
main interests” and a “foreign nonmain proceeding” to mean “a foreign
proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a country
where the debtor has an establishment.” 57 While Chapter 15 contains a
number of definitions solely applicable to that chapter, and is in fact the
only chapter of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to do so, many of the terms
surrounding the “foreign main” and “foreign nonmain” designations are
wholly undefined. While “establishment” is defined as “any place of
operations where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic
activity,”58 neither “operations” nor “nontransitory economic activity” are
defined in the Code, and no definition exists which clearly delineates what
qualifies as a debtor’s “center of main interests” (COMI).59 Since
recognition is the gateway through which virtually any relief may be
obtained in the U.S. courts under Chapter 15, the lack of clarity surrounding
these terms has driven controversy in the courts.
Moreover, just as recognition of any type is paramount in establishing
a right to relief in the U.S. courts, determining recognition of a foreign
proceeding as main or nonmain is key in assessing what types of relief a
foreign entity may seek within the system. The relief available to a foreign
main representative under Chapter 15 includes the automatic stay of all of a
53
11 U.S.C. § 101(23). Note that while Chapter 15 contains definitions solely applicable
to that Chapter, the definitions contained in Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code also apply
per 11 U.S.C. § 103(a); see U.S. v. J.A. Jones Const. Group, LLC, 333 B.R. 637, 638 n.2
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(23)–(24) for reference); see also Melnik, supra
note 30, at 284 n.72 (detailing that eighty-six definitions contained in Section 101 apply to
Chapter 15).
54
11 U.S.C. § 1517.
55
See UNCITRAL, supra note 5, ¶¶ 20, 28–31.
56
In re Ran, 390 B.R. 257, 292 (Bankr. S. D. Tex. 2008) (“In accordance with In re Bear
Stearns High–Grade Structured Credit, comity is not an element of recognition; it is rather, a
consideration once recognition is granted”).
57
11 U.S.C. § 1502(4)–(5) (2006).
58
11 U.S.C. § 1502(2).
59
See Melnik, supra note 30, at 275; Lavie v. Ran, 384 B.R. 469 (S.D. Tex. 2008). 11
U.S.C. § 1516 does establish that “[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, the debtor’s
registered office, or habitual residence in the case of an individual, is presumed to be the
center of the debtor’s main interests,” but this has proven to be far from clear for courts
confronting COMI analysis.
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debtor’s property within U.S. jurisdictional boundaries 60 and allowance to
voluntarily file a Chapter 11 case, while a foreign nonmain representative is
limited to filing only an involuntary Chapter 11 case. 61 The practical effect
of this distinction stems from the fact that because a proceeding classified
as “foreign nonmain” will be barred from any voluntary Chapter 11
petition, creditors could be given greater control in seeking judicial
insolvency remedies. 62
Section 1516(c) aims to shed some light in defining the debtor’s
“center of main interests.” It details that “[i]n the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the debtor’s registered office, or habitual residence in the case
of an individual, is presumed to be the center of the debtor’s main
interests.”63 Courts have held that this is a rebuttable presumption. 64
2. COMI Analysis in U.S. Courts
A few early U.S. court cases confronting the Section 1516(c)
presumption applied a straightforward and uninquiring analysis of the
debtor’s COMI. Consider In re Artimm.65 Though ultimately decided
under the old Section 304 standards due to the timing of filing, the court
there explored the standards of the new Chapter 15 procedure. 66 It
concluded that because the Italian debtor corporation Artimm had a
registered office in Rome, it would assume that the company’s center of
main interests was in Rome. 67 Another early Chapter 15 case, In re TriContinental Exchange Ltd., also applied a simplified COMI analysis. 68 The
court stated that the debtor’s main office or place of incorporation could be
accepted as a proxy for COMI generally, but highlighted that different
60

See In re Artimm, S.r.L., 335 B.R. 149, 159 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 2005) (“The
consequences of an order recognizing a foreign main proceeding are substantial. Most
dramatically, the U.S. automatic stay, in all its details, applies immediately with respect to
the debtor and property of the debtor that is located within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States. See § 1520(a)(1). This is a major change from the law under § 304, which
required a court order for the imposition of a stay on domestic creditor collection action.”).
61
Elkin, supra note 50, at 960; see also Gropper, supra note 31, at 704–07, 724–25
(detailing the list of forms of relief available to main and nonmain proceeding parties).
62
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (a voluntary bankruptcy petition is filed by the debtor, while
an involuntary petition is filed by creditors that meet certain requirements).
63
See generally In re Artimm, 335 B.R. at 159; In re Tri-Continental Exchange, Ltd., 349
B.R. 627, 635 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006) (examining main offices as potential COMI
locations).
64
See In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d 371 B.R. 10
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Pursuant to the introductory clause to [Section] 1516(c), however, that
presumption may be rebutted.”).
65
335 B.R. at 149–66.
66
Id. at 159.
67
Id.
68
In re Tri-Continental Exch., Ltd., 349 B.R. at 631.
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situations could present various levels of COMI acceptance, as described in
the chart below:69
Location of Foreign Proceeding

COMI Analysis

Country of debtor’s registered office
(or place of incorporation)

Country is presumed as the proxy for
COMI absent evidence that the
debtor’s COMI is elsewhere, in which
case the foreign representative bears
the burden of proof on COMI

Country other than the country of
debtor’s registered office (or place of
incorporation)

Foreign representative bears
burden of proof on COMI

the

In that case, the debtors were a number of insurance companies
operating under the laws of the Caribbean islands making up St. Vincent
and the Grenadines (SVG). The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court
appointed liquidators during the companies’ winding-up proceedings.70 A
creditor argued that the case should not be deemed a foreign main
proceeding since most of the alleged defrauded creditors were located in the
United States.71 However, the court held that because the debtors
“conducted regular business operations at their registered offices” in SVG,
the nation would qualify as the companies’ COMI “even though the
enterprise perpetrated an insurance scam primarily in the United States and
Canada.”72
During the same month of the In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd.
decision, the court of the Southern District of New York issued the first of
three decisions directly addressing the standard for rebutting the
presumption of COMI under Section 1516(c).
First, In re SPhinX involved a debtor that had incorporated and
registered in the Cayman Islands, kept some business records in the
country, and received some mail there. 73 In accordance with local
regulations, the company was not authorized to and did not conduct any
business in the Cayman Islands, had no employees there, and maintained no
assets in the country.74 The court ruled that these factors, along with the
facts that the debtor had $500 million in assets in the United States and all
of the debtor’s corporate processes were handled in the United States, were
enough to rebut the presumption of the COMI being located in the
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 635.
Id. at 629–30.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 629.
351 B.R. at 119.
Id. at 107–08.
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Caymans.75 The court instead recognized the proceeding as a “foreign
nonmain” proceeding where there was no objection to the recognition and
“no negative consequences would appear to result from recognizing the
Cayman Islands proceedings as nonmain proceedings.”76 Writing more
generally, the SPhinX court noted that while the Bankruptcy Code did not
state the type of evidence required to rebut the COMI presumption, various
factors could be relevant to the COMI determination, including:
[T]he location of the debtor’s headquarters; the location of those who
actually manage the debtor (which, conceivably could be the
headquarters of a holding company); the location of the debtor’s
primary assets; the location of the majority of the debtor’s creditors
or of a majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case;
and/or the jurisdiction whose law would apply to most disputes. 77

Under this reasoning, the debtors’ proceeding in In re Tri-Continental
Exchange Ltd. would likely also fail to be recognized as a foreign main
proceeding since the “majority of the creditors who would be affected by
the case” did reside in the United States rather than in St. Vincent and the
Grenadines.78
Two other cases in the Southern District of New York, In re Bear
Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund. Ltd. (Bear
Stearns)79 and In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) (Basis Yield),80 also
examined the recognition status of entities incorporated in the Cayman
Islands and also concluded that the COMI was not the Caymans and thus
the proceedings could not be recognized as foreign main proceedings.
However, unlike the court in In re SPhinX, both the Bear Stearns and Basis
Yield courts refused to recognize the foreign proceeding as a foreign
nonmain proceeding.
The debtor party in Bear Stearns, two investment funds registered as
limited liability companies in the Cayman Islands but administered and
managed by a U.S. company and with assets in the United States, looked
substantially similar to the debtor in SPhinX.81 The Bear Stearns court,
however, squarely rejected the dicta of the SPhinX decision which indicated
that the lack of an objection by a party in interest was enough to green-light
the approval of a foreign main or nonmain proceeding.82 The court asserted
75

Id.
Id. at 122.
77
Id. at 117.
78
See also In re SPhinX, Ltd., 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (upholding the 2006 SPhinX
decision on appeal).
79
374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
80
381 B.R. 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
81
In re Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 124.
82
Id. at 126; see also Daniel M. Glosband et al., SPhinX Chapter 15 Opinion Misses the
Mark, 26-10 AM. BANKR. INST. J. (2007), available at www.abiworld.org.
76
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that “recognition under section 1517 is not to be rubber stamped by the
courts. This Court must make an independent determination as to whether
the foreign proceeding meets the definitional requirements of sections 1502
and 1517 of the Bankruptcy Code.”83 The court first reached its decision
that the company was not entitled to foreign main proceeding recognition.
It looked to both the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency84 and a recent landmark COMI decision from the
European Court of Justice, known as the Eurofood case85 to determine that
the COMI presumption could be easily rebutted in the case of a “letterbox”
company.
Further, the court found that the proceeding could not be recognized as
a foreign nonmain proceeding because there was no “establishment” as
required under 11 U.S.C.A. § 1517 and defined under § 1502.86 According
to the court, in order to meet the requirements of § 1517, “there must be an
‘establishment’ in the Cayman Islands for the conduct of nontransitory
economic activity, i.e., a local place of business.”87 In this case, the funds
in question were exempted entities that were prohibited from and did not
engage in business in the Caymans “except in furtherance of their business
otherwise carried on outside of the Cayman Islands”88 as required by
Cayman Islands law, 89 and the entities could not meet the establishment
requirement of § 1517. Interestingly, the decision was upheld on appeal by
the same judge who also upheld the SPhinX decision a little more than a
year before.90 In addressing the reasoning within these seemingly
83
In re Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 126. Note that the Judge in this case, J. Burton R.
Lifland, participated in the drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law and continued to
participate in UNCITRAL Insolvency matters after the development of the law.
Multinational Judicial Colloquium, UNCITRAL-INSOL International, Mar. 22–23, 1995,
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/FirstJC.pdf; Multinational Judicial
Colloquium, UNCITRAL-INSOL International, Oct. 13–14, 1999, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/ThirdJC.pdf.
84
In re Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 129; G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan.
30, 1998); UNCITRAL, supra note 5; see also H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 169 n. 101.
85
See Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd. 2006 E.C.R. I-03813, at ¶ 35, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm. As noted by the European Court of Justice,
the COMI presumption may be overcome “particular[ly] in the case of a ‘letterbox’ company
not carrying out any business in the territory of the Member State in which its registered
office is situated.” See also In re SPhinX, Ltd., 371 B.R. 10 (citing to Eurofood and the
“letterbox” exception). See generally UNCITRAL, supra note 5, ¶ 122 (explaining that the
presumption does “not prevent, in accordance with applicable procedural law, calling for or
assessing other evidence if the conclusion suggested by the presumption is called into
question by the court or an interested party”).
86
11 U.S.C. § 1502(2), (5) (2006).
87
In In re Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 131.
88
Id.
89
Companies Law (2004 Revision) of the Cayman Islands § 193.
90
See In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 389
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inconsistent opinions, Judge Sweet stated that “any language in [the SPhinX
opinion on appeal] bearing on the bankruptcy court’s nonmain
determination must be viewed as dicta” and “it must also be noted that there
is no presumption applicable to the recognition determination with respect
to a nonmain proceeding,” suggesting a broader basis of flexibility in
making a nonmain determination.91
Less than six months after the initial ruling in Bear Stearns, the Basis
Yield court arrived at a similar conclusion to the Bear Stearns court.92 In
that case, joint provisional liquidators (JPLs) of a foreign debtor fund
registered in the Cayman Islands filed a petition for recognition of a foreign
main proceeding in the Caymans. 93 There were no objections to the
recognition by any party in interest, and the JPLs argued they were entitled
to the presumption of the COMI in the Cayman Islands under Section
1516.94 The court rejected this argument, however, holding that while the
COMI presumption existed to ensure speed, convenience, and cost-savings
for the parties, it did not limit the ability of the court to examine the
presumed COMI more closely if it deems “the issues to be sufficiently
material to warrant further inquiry” and possibly rebut the presumption. 95
Like in Bear Stearns, the Basis Yield court determined that the proceeding
could not properly be recognized either as a foreign main or nonmain
proceeding under Chapter 15.
3. COMI Analysis in Foreign Courts: The Eurofood Decision
While the development of COMI analysis in the context of insolvency
law is still relatively young both in the United States and abroad, it is not all
that surprising that U.S. courts have found themselves struggling with the
same difficulties facing other UNCITRAL Model Law nations in
determining which COMI analysis best meets the needs and interests of
creditors, debtors, and the standard of comity among States. Nevertheless,
foreign models interpreting COMI have been and will likely continue to be
useful and influential sources for U.S. judges examining the issue.
First, it is important to note that examination of certain foreign models
and caselaw in the COMI context is not simply a useful tool based on the
similarities of the Model Law implementation, but in fact urged by the
Model Law and Chapter 15 itself,96 and a number of decisions have looked
B.R. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
91
Id. at 334.
92
See In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
93
Id.
94
In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund, 381 B.R. at 43; see 11 U.S.C. § 1516 (stating that “in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the debtor’s registered office, or habitual residence
in the case of an individual, is presumed to be the center of the debtor’s main interests”).
95
Id. at 52.
96
11 U.S.C. § 1508 (“In interpreting this chapter, the court shall consider its international
origin, and the need to promote an application of this chapter that is consistent with the
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to the UNCITRAL Guide to the Model Law and foreign case decisions
when assessing U.S. petitions.97
One of the most substantive and influential non-U.S. decisions
examining COMI was Eurofood, ultimately adjudicated by the European
Court of Justice (EJC) in 2006.98 In that case, the company at issue,
Eurofood, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Parmalat, a company
incorporated in Italy and operating through subsidiary companies in more
than two dozen countries.99 Eurofood’s registered office was in Dublin,
Ireland, and its principal objective was providing financing for other
subsidiaries of Parmalat.100 Following the collapse of the Parmalat Group
into a financial crisis in late 2003, both Ireland and Italy issued rulings that
held their own States as Eurofood’s COMI and accordingly determined
their own States were the nation of the main insolvency proceeding. 101 The
jurisdictional dispute was referred to the EJC, which ruled in favor of the
Irish courts. According to its ruling, when a debtor subsidiary entity goes
beyond merely keeping a “letterbox” or post-office address in a nation and
instead actually carries out its business where its registered office is located,
the fact that the parent company can control the subsidiary from another
state is not enough to rebut the presumption of COMI.102 Instead, rebuttal
can only take place “if factors which are both objective and ascertainable by
third parties enable it to be established that an actual situation exists which
is different from that which location at that registered office is deemed to
reflect.”103 Moreover, this focus on third parties—namely, creditors—is
important to “ensure legal certainty and foreseeability concerning the
determination of the court with jurisdiction to open main insolvency
proceedings.”104

application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.”).
97
See, e.g., In re Ran, 390 B.R. 257 (Bankr. S. D. Tex. 2008); SPhinX, Ltd., 371 B.R. 10;
Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 129.
98
Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-03813, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm; see also Samuel J. Bufford, Center of Main
Interests, International Insolvency Case Venue, and Equality of Arms: The Eurofood
Decision of the European Court of Justice, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 351 (2007) (discussion
and in-depth analysis of the Eurofood case).
99
Id.
100
Bufford, supra note 98, at 364–65. Note that the office was located at the Custom
House Dock in Dublin, a center dedicated to businesses that operate in internationally traded
financial services to non-residents of Ireland and provide a number of tax haven benefits to
those businesses. Samuel J. Bufford, International Insolvency Case Venue in the European
Union: The Parmalat and Daisytek Controversies, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 429, 440 (2006).
101
Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-03813, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm.
102
Id.
103
Id. at I-3868.
104
Id.
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4. Analysis
The Eurofood emphasis on predictability and special attention to
creditor interests is something that should be kept top-of-mind by U.S.
courts examining COMI analysis issues. While the COMI test on its face
seems to focus solely on the debtor, the SPhinX court’s list of both debtor
and creditor-based factors when determining COMI is likely more just, 105
especially when confronted with debtor entities aiming to avoid U.S. tax
and insolvency law by incorporating and registering in “tax-haven”
countries. While the goals of Chapter 15 dictate that the aims are to
“protects the interests of all creditors, and other interested entities,
including the debtor” and to ensure the “protection and maximization of the
value of the debtor’s assets,”106 shifting the balance of factors in favor of
creditors may meet another prime goal of Chapter 15: to create “greater
legal certainty for trade and investment.” 107 Moreover, giving more weight
to creditor predictability could serve to discourage forum shopping by
would-be debtors and fall squarely in line with the interests indicated in
other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code. 108
An emphasis on creditor-based factors in the COMI analysis, however,
should not be limited to where the majority of affected creditors are located,
however, but also look to the potential outcome for both creditors and
debtors in the longer-term insolvency proceeding. For example, one
significant criticism of the Eurofood decision was that by focusing solely on
the COMI of the subsidiary entity Eurofood rather than the parent company
Parmalat, the EJC set in motion a precedent which would ultimately
complicate the insolvency proceedings of corporate groups and multinational holding companies since each subsidiary could presumably have a
different COMI than its parent.109 In the long-term, these complications
could incur significant damage to all interested creditors by creating delay
and expense in proceedings across nations. Taken together, the long-term
best interests of the creditors—and debtors for that matter—might have best
been served with a single case proceeding of all the Parmalat subsidiaries in
one country.
105
“[T]he location of the debtor’s headquarters; the location of those who actually
manage the debtor (which, conceivably could be the headquarters of a holding company); the
location of the debtor’s primary assets; the location of the majority of the debtor’s creditors
or of a majority of the creditors who would be affected by the case; and/or the jurisdiction
whose law would apply to most disputes.” SPhinX, 351 B.R. at 117.
106
11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(3)–(4) (2006).
107
11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(2).
108
See, e.g., the so-called “best interest of creditors” tests indicated in Chapter 11(11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)), Chapter 13 (11 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4)), and Chapter 9 (11 U.S.C. §
943(b)(7)).
109
Bufford, supra note 98, at 381. See generally Aaron M. Kaufman, The European
Union Goes Comi-tose: Hazards of Harmonizing Corporate Insolvency Laws in the Global
Economy, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 625 (2007).
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Beyond the COMI analysis itself, the question still remains if cases
like Bear Stearns and Basis Yield, which rejected both foreign main and
foreign nonmain recognition, truly serve the interests and goals of Chapter
15 and the aims of the UNCITRAL Model Law. As noted by one
commentator, recognition is “effectively . . . an ‘entry visa’ jurisdictional
prerequisite to seeking relief from any court within the United States.”110 If
a proceeding is not properly recognized as foreign main or foreign nonmain,
does that then mean there is no legal recourse for a petitioner’s relief within
the U.S. courts? The court in In re Bear Stearns answered this question in
the negative, asserting that Section 303(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code
“specifically provides that an involuntary case may be commenced under
chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code by a foreign representative of the
estate in a foreign proceeding so that a foreign representative is not left
remediless upon nonrecognition.”111 An earlier decision in the neighboring
Eastern District of New York, however, highlighted that “in the absence of
recognition under chapter 15” the federal court “has no authority to
consider [a] request for a stay” against a foreign debtor.112 Chapter 15 itself
seems to provide that in some cases a petitioner might indeed be left
without recourse for relief. While 11 U.S.C.A. § 1509(f) indicates that
relief can be sought under other measures in the U.S. courts (including §
303), that right to relief is subject to other provisions of the section,
including § 1509(d) which states that “if the court denies recognition under
this chapter, the court may issue any appropriate order necessary to prevent
the foreign representative from obtaining comity or cooperation from courts
in the United States.”113 Thus, in some cases, an unrecognized petitioner
might be effectively “banned” from seeking cooperation or relief through
Section 303 or otherwise. While there may be extreme cases in which
action under Section 1509(d) is necessary, courts should weigh these
actions against the interests of debtors and creditors who may well be
entitled to relief in some measure within the U.S. court system. 114
B. The Public Policy Exception
1. The Public Policy Exception and the Principle of Comity
Under the former international insolvency provision of 11 U.S.C. §
110

See Melnik, supra note 30, at 273–74 (noting there are limited exceptions within §
1509 but that these “exceptions” are not without their own complications).
111
Bear Stearns, 374 B.R. at 132. Section 303(b)(4) reads that “An involuntary case
against a person is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under
chapter 7 or 11 of this title . . . by a foreign representative of the estate in a foreign
proceeding concerning such person.” 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4).
112
United States v. J.A. Jones Constr. Grp., LLC, 333 B.R. 637, 639 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
113
11 U.S.C. § 1509(d) & (f) (2006).
114
As of November 2010, only five published cases had addressed § 1509(d) at all, and
none of them addressed it in depth.
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304, bankruptcy courts were given broad discretion to recognize cases
ancillary to foreign insolvency proceedings consistent with, among other
things, the just treatment of creditors and the principles of comity. 115 In
general and within the bankruptcy context, comity can be viewed as
appropriate where foreign “proceedings do not violate the laws or public
policy of the United States, and if the foreign court abides by fundamental
standards of procedural fairness.”116 Thus, under the standard of Section
304, the court’s discretion to accord relief included the discretion to reject
the right relief based on the principle of comity.
In adopting the UNCITRAL’s more “cooperative” international
standards including the mandatory recognition of foreign main proceedings,
Chapter 15 also enacted Article 6 of the Model Law verbatim. Section
1506 states: “[n]othing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to
take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly
contrary to the public policy of the United States.”117 In its adoption,
Congress noted that the provision of Article 6 “has been narrowly
interpreted on a consistent basis in courts around the world” and such a
narrow interpretation would also be expected in U.S. courts.118 Moreover,
Congress dictated that “the word ‘manifestly’ in international usage restricts
the public policy exception to the most fundamental policies of the United
States.”119 This interpretation coincides with the intent of the drafters of the
Model Law,120 and has been noted by some U.S. courts.121
2. Applying the Public Policy Exception in U.S. Courts
In the few cases to date that have claimed public policy violations and
aimed to invoke Section 1506, courts seemed to follow Congressional intent
and almost entirely rejected the claims, indeed treating the provision, as it
was described by one court, as a “safety valve” to the requirements of
Chapter 15 recognition.122 Since few decisions to date have found that the
fundamental policies of the United States were at risk and invoked the
public policy exception,123 case law is still far from comprehensive as to
115

11 U.S.C. § 304(c) (repealed 2005).
Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir.1999).
117
11 U.S.C. § 1506.
118
H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172.
119
Id.
120
UNCITRAL, supra note 5, ¶¶ 88–89 (1997) (stating that “article 6 is only intended to
be invoked under exceptional circumstances concerning matters of fundamental importance
for the enacting State”).
121
See, e.g., In re Tri-Cont’l Exch., Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 638 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006)
(“Congress has indicated, with its use of the phrase ‘manifestly contrary,’ that this exception
is to be narrowly construed, which view is consistent with the explication in the
[UNCITRAL Model Law] Guide.”).
122
Basis Yield, 381 B.R. at 45 n. 27.
123
In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R.
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what circumstances can constitute a risk great enough to overcome
considerations of comity and international cooperation in insolvency
proceedings. Nevertheless, key decisions are beginning to form a cohesive
standard indicating the use of the doctrine in only very narrow
circumstances.
Most recently, the district court of the Eastern District of Virginia
endeavored to reconcile what it viewed as the most in-depth published
decisions examining § 1506 and to develop principles for evaluating claims
pursuant to it in In re Qimonda AG Bankruptcy Litigation (Qimonda).124
The court began by noting that the key decisions in this area agreed that
“the fact that application of foreign law leads to a different result than
application of U.S. law is, without more, insufficient to support § 1506
protection,” though such a conflict of laws is a necessary prerequisite to any
viable § 1506 claim. 125 In addition to this principle, the court held that at
least two other principles should guide courts analyzing whether an action
within a Chapter 15 proceeding is “manifestly contrary to the public policy
of the United States.”126 First, the court stated that a foreign proceeding
should not be given deference where that court’s procedural fairness was in
question or could not be resolved by additional legal protections. 127 In
addition, the court stated that court action in Chapter 15 cases should be
avoided where it might frustrate a U.S. court’s ability to administer the
Chapter 15 proceeding and/or would impinge severely a U.S. constitutional
or statutory right, particularly if a party continues to enjoy the benefits of
the Chapter 15 proceeding.128 Notably, the Qimonda court cited these
considerations as just some of the guiding principles that courts could use in
making a § 1506 determination.129
Aligning with this reasoning, courts have held that none of the
following are enough to properly invoke the public policy exception: the
potential for U.S. creditors to get less money as a result of a foreign
proceeding,130 the inability to conduct a jury trial in the foreign
proceeding,131 or the enforcement of a non-debtor, third party release and
injunction valid under foreign law but which might not be valid under U.S.

357 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009).
124
433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. 2010) (the Qimonda court focused its attention on four
decisions, In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Invs., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010), In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R. 773 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008), In re Ephedra Prods.
Liab. Litig., 349 B.R. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), and Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357).
125
In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. at 568.
126
11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006).
127
In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. at 570.
128
Id. at 570.
129
Id.
130
Ernst & Young, Inc. 383 BR 773.
131
Ephedra Prods., 349 B.R. at 336–37.
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bankruptcy law standards.132
One significant case which held § 1506 to apply in an action of a
Chapter 15 proceeding was In re Gold & Honey, Ltd.133 There, the debtors
were Gold & Honey, Ltd. (G&H Ltd.), a corporation formed and organized
in Israel, and Gold & Honey LP (G&H LP), a United States’ limited
partnership whose general partnership included a large equity stake owned
by G&H Ltd.134 In July 2008, an Israeli banking corporation and
prepetition lender to G&H LP forced the seizure of both of G&H entities’
assets and began an Israeli receivership proceeding. 135 Shortly thereafter,
the debtors filed a Chapter 11 petition, invoking the automatic stay of 11
U.S.C. § 362. Despite the bankruptcy court’s instruction to discontinue its
proceedings in light of the automatic stay, the Israeli court continued to
prosecute its receivership proceeding. 136 In January 2009, the lender filed
motions to lift the automatic stay and filed for petition of recognition of the
Israeli proceeding under Chapter 15.137
The court refused to recognize the Israeli proceeding as either foreign
main or foreign nonmain because, inter alia, the appointment of the Israeli
receivers was a violation of the automatic stay and recognition of the
foreign proceeding would “have an adverse effect on public policy” under
Section 1506. 138 The court asserted that the lenders proceeded with the
receivership proceeding in Israel “in spite of and in the face of [the U.S.]
Court’s Stay Order” and that recognizing the Chapter 15 petition and the
receivers “appointed as the result of a knowing a willful violation of the
stay” order would “fly in the face of the Bankruptcy Code.” 139 Moreover,
recognizing the violation as valid by allowing the Israeli receivers to
proceed in collection of the debtor’s assets would prevent U.S. bankruptcy
courts from carrying out important fundamental policies and purposes of
the automatic stay.140 Specifically, “preventing one creditor from obtaining
an advantage over other creditors, and providing for the efficient and
orderly distribution of a debtor’s assets to all creditors in accordance with
their relative priorities.”141
132

In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Inves., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Gold & Honey, 410 B.R. 357 (this case was one examined by the Qimonda court in
developing its principles); see also Toft, 453 B.R. 186 (recently holding violation of Section
1506 where a German Mail Interception Order would “directly contravene U.S. laws and
public policies” including electronic privacy rights, the powers of estate representatives, and
the rights of parties affected by court orders to notice).
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Gold & Honey, 410 B.R. at 362.
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Id. at 362–63.
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Id. at 363.
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Id. at 365.
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Id. at 368.
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3. Analysis
While it appears from the decisions addressing § 1506 thus far that
courts have very narrowly construed the provision, there is potential for the
public policy exception to be used in some cases that would go against the §
1501 goals of international cooperation, comity, and fair and efficient
administration of cross-border insolvencies. In order to maintain the
narrowness of the use of the public policy exception while still ensuring the
spirit of international cooperation and fairness to debtors and creditors,
courts can keep a few things in mind. First, the principles detailed in the
recent Qimonda decision provide a good starting point for evaluating
potential § 1506 claims, but courts should also take care to examine any
U.S. constitutional or statutory rights within the context of the Bankruptcy
Code and against the broader, global understanding of fair and just
treatment in insolvency proceedings. This narrow examination has, in the
past, led courts to discard a challenge of potential removal of a jury right,
since the right to a jury in the bankruptcy context is quite rare and many
non-jury foreign proceedings can still result in a “fair and impartial
proceeding.”142
Unlike the COMI issue where creditor rights should arguably play a
larger role in a COMI analysis and recognition determination, creditor and
debtor rights are and should continue to be secondary or even tertiary
considerations in the public policy exception. 143 If recognition could
significantly harm the fundamental interests of the United States, § 1506
will be properly invoked and recognition denied, even if recognition could
serve to significantly benefit U.S. creditor interests. One commentator has
noted that alternative measures might be taken by the court to ensure
fairness and opportunity to potentially gain relief without invoking the
public policy exception, namely, challenging the debtor’s COMI and citing
§ 1521(b) to ensure that “the court is satisfied that the interests of creditors
in the United States are sufficiently protected.” 144 While these measures
seem useful, they can only be properly invoked if due care is given to U.S.
creditor interests, as suggested above, particularly with regard to the COMI
analysis. Further, courts facing significant violations of comity and
fundamental policies breached upon the United States by other nations, as
appeared to be the case in In re Gold & Honey, should not shy away from
utilizing the § 1506 public policy exception, lest they encourage greater
forum shopping and continued blatant violations of the comity principle by
foreign nations.

142
143
144

Ephedra Prods., 349 B.R. at 336–37.
See Ernst & Young, 383 BR 773.
Mund, supra note 21, at 354; 11 U.S.C. § 1521(b) (2006).
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III. CONCLUSIONS
As discussed in this Comment, case law development pursuant to
Chapter 15 matters should continue the tradition, already at work in some
U.S. courts, to examine foreign cases and models as well as the
UNCITRAL Guide to the Model Law for instructive guidance in decisionmaking, especially surrounding the COMI analysis. In addition, a shifting
of the balance of factors in the COMI analysis towards broad creditor
interests could likely better meet the Chapter 15 goal of ensuring “greater
legal certainty for trade and investment” 145 while protecting U.S. creditor
rights and interests. Finally, courts will likely continue to narrowly
construe the public policy exception of § 1506, aligning with the principle
of comity and meeting the UNCITRAL objective of greater international
cooperation in insolvency proceedings.
With regard to the COMI analysis, the public policy exception, and
other emerging and potentially developing legal issues surrounding Chapter
15 matters, there is a broader step U.S. courts can take to meet all of the
goals of § 1501 and the objectives of the UNCITRAL Model Law overall
while providing caselaw guidance for other nations examining insolvency
issues: publishing opinions.
Though about 300 cases have been
commenced under Chapter 15 since its enactment, and likely more petitions
rejected,146 only about forty-five opinions have been published examining
the petitions, proceedings, or related adversary proceedings. 147 A practice
of publishing opinions surrounding Chapter 15 issues more frequently will
not only provide greater guidance for U.S. courts investigating these issues
but also continue the longstanding tradition of U.S. leadership and
innovation in the field of international insolvency law by providing
concrete models for foreign courts to examine. 148
145

11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(2).
See sources cited, supra note 6.
147
Author Selina A. Melnik documented that in mid-February 2009, only 16 published
opinions existed. Melnik, supra note 30, at 267–68. A search of Westlaw on November 18,
2010, returned sixteen more decisions, some concerning the same case or issue (In re Condor
Ins. Ltd., 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Ran, 607 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Loy,
432 B.R. 551 (E.D. Va. 2010); In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va.
2010); Lavie v. Ran, 406 B.R. 277 (S.D. Tex 2009); In re Bozel S.A., 434 B.R. 86 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re British Am. Ins. Co. Ltd., 425 B.R. 884 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010); In re
Chiang, 437 B.R. 397 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 2010); In re JSC BTA Bank, 434 B.R. 334 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Japan Airlines Corp., 425 B.R. 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re
Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Invs., 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re RHTC
Liquidating Co., 424 B.R. 714 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010); In re Atlas Shipping, A/S 404 B.R.
726 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2009); In re Spansion, Inc., 418 B.R. 84 (Bankr. Del. 2009); In re Steadman 410 B.R. 397,
(Bankr. N.J. 2009)).
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Note that in addition to court opinions, further action by Congress may be relevant
and useful in legal developments in this area. While for many years after its adoption no
readily apparent Congressional action had addressed Chapter 15, the recent Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010))
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required that a study and report to Congress be completed examining the mechanisms and
extent of “international coordination relating to bankruptcy process for financial companies.”
Though narrow in scope, this report could also help contribute to the development of
Chapter 15 jurisprudence or lead to further Congressional examination of the Chapter more
broadly.
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